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ABSTRACT 
 
BRANDON RICE: The Paradox of Pipelines: Economic and Political Effects of Transit 
Wealth 
(Under the direction of Dr. Malada Anna Vachudova) 
 
 
This article investigates the impact oil and gas pipelines have had on the political 
and economic development countries such as Ukraine and Belarus. The article uses post-
Soviet Ukraine as a case study to develop a transit curse theory highlighting the negative 
effects of transit revenues. This transit curse in many ways operates similarly to the well-
known resource curse, disrupting healthy economic growth and preventing the 
establishment of responsible governance. The example of Ukraine shows that even once 
the transit revenues are effectively removed, the legacy of the formal and informal 
institutions built up by those revenues continues to hinder healthy economic growth and 
accountable governance.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The sight of tents and orange-clad protesters on the streets of downtown Kyiv 
marked what many observers thought was the beginning of a new chapter in Ukraine’s 
post-Soviet economic and political development. The 2004 electoral revolution in 
Ukraine was hailed as yet another surge in the “third wave” of democratization. Such 
optimism, it appears, was premature. While we have seen intense political competition, 
fairer elections and more orderly rotation in office since those snow-filled weeks in 2004, 
Ukrainian elites have failed to significantly improve the way the government and 
economy are managed. This disappointing state of affairs raises two questions. First, why 
did this democratic breakthrough only materialize in late-2004, and not earlier like in 
many of Ukraine’s eastern European neighbors such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Poland? Second, why has stronger political competition and regular political turnover not 
brought more effective and accountable management of the economy and state?   
I argue that oil and gas pipelines have contributed substantially to Ukraine’s 
political and economic backwardness. First, in comparison with many of its neighbors, 
Ukraine failed to exhibit healthy economic growth and develop truly democratic 
institutions in the late-1990s and early-2000s. I argue that transit revenues systematically 
damaged the economy while simultaneously enabling the government to maintain a tight 
grip on power despite such failings.1 Crucially, significant revenues generated by the 
                                                        
1
 Authors such at Michael McFaul have noted that there was impressive growth in Ukraine’s GDP in the 
last years of Kuchma’s reign, but I contend that such GDP growth was buoyed by large transit revenues and 
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pipelines allowed the ruling elites to subsidize society, thus dampening internal demands 
for democratization and liberalization. Additionally, the pipeline network enabled then-
President Leonid Kuchma to act as a rent-distributing arbiter to ensure the loyalty of 
economic and political elites. In this way, transit revenues in Kuchma-era Ukraine 
permitted the establishment of a two-tiered rentier society built around oil and gas 
pipelines.  
Second, the post-Orange-Revolution elites have failed to reliably and effectively 
govern. I argue that here too the pipeline network has played a significant, albeit more 
indirect, role in hindering accountable governance. While the electoral system was 
significantly improved, many other aspects of society remained unreformed. Most 
importantly, the rentier society that emerged under Kuchma (and was significantly 
supported by transit revenues) was left untouched while at the same time the energy trade 
remained opaque and riddled with corruption.  
In 2006, the situation changed dramatically: the country’s leaders agreed to an 
arrangement that effectively negated the substantial transit revenues flowing into state 
coffers. The loss of such revenues has put enormous strain on the Ukrainian state budget, 
already burdened by the legacy of high subsidies and low taxation. Ukrainian leaders, 
however, fearful of taking social benefits away from the electorate, have allowed the 
budget to amass larger and larger deficits, bringing the economy as a whole to the point 
of collapse. While increased political competition did lead to the institutional reforms 
prescribed by comparative politics scholars, such as an improved electoral system, it did 
not bring improved governance.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
government expenditures. Such growth was neither healthy nor sustainable, as evidenced by the collapse of 
economic growth following the removal of such significant transit revenues in 2006−2009. 
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 My purpose in this thesis is two fold. First, I develop a theory identifying 
substantial transit revenues as an important mechanism hindering healthy economic 
growth and democratic development in countries. I call this theory the transit curse. 
Second, I show that while increased political competition may foster much-needed 
institutional reforms, it does not necessarily lead to improved governance.  
This article is divided into seven sections. Before I deal with the complex 
processes at work, I need to first establish the facts regarding transit revenues in Ukraine. 
Therefore, the first section is devoted to sorting through the details of what is a rather 
opaque business. To do so I rely on a myriad of Russian-, Ukrainian- and English-
language sources. Among first-hand sources, I utilize Naftogaz annual reports, official 
Ukrainian state budgets and documents from other official statistical offices. I rely on 
second-hand sources as well, such as publications from the Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies, the Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Ukrainian 
newspapers and a leading scholars in the field.  
The second section introduces the main elements of the transit curse that afflicts 
countries such as Ukraine. In doing so, I tap the vast literature on the development-
retarding aspects of natural resource endowment, also known as the resource curse. The 
transit curse has three main effects: the Dutch disease hinders healthy economic growth; 
the rentier effect dampens domestic pressure for more effective governance; and sending 
state leverage affords the energy-exporting state extraordinary influence over the transit 
government.  
Having established the existence of transit rents and the theoretical underpinnings 
of the transit curse, in the third section I explore how the recently centralized transit 
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revenues affected the economic development and democratic trajectory of Ukraine—a 
country which, given its history, location and population, should have been among the 
success stories of post-communist eastern Europe, not one of the laggards. I examine 
three effects of the transit curse from 2000 to 2005 in Ukraine. First, I show that at the 
very least Ukraine’s economy possesses many of the symptoms of one caught in the 
resource trap. Second, I highlight how Kuchma’s regime used the pipeline network to 
buy patronage from the masses and extract loyalty from the elite. Third, I demonstrate 
how Ukraine’s ‘double dependence’ afforded the Russian government and state-owned 
export monopolies extraordinary influence over Ukraine.  
Billions of dollars in transit revenues, while able to buy patronage and loyalty in 
the short and medium term, failed to prop up the corrupt and inefficient regime in the 
face of a nearly unified international outcry against a horribly botched attempt to steal the 
2004 presidential election for Kuchma’s hand-picked successor. Addressing the 
confluence of factors that allowed the Orange leaders to seize on an outburst of popular 
support is beyond the scope of this paper, but suffice it to say that it took the coincidence 
of powerful internal and external dynamics to make it possible. This ‘revolution’ was 
nearly immediately hailed as a huge success for democracy in eastern Europe. It was 
thought by many to be the beginning of Ukraine’s long-awaited reconnect with Europe. 
Unfortunately, the electoral and institutional reforms that followed have not moved the 
country any closer to Europe, nor have they led to improved governance.  
With that in mind, in section four I first discuss the expectations placed on post-
Kuchma Ukraine by observers and scholars, both domestic and foreign. Those 
expectations, however, have simply not been met. Five years on we see little to no 
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improvement in internationally assessed governance indicators, continued corruption and 
an economy on the brink of total collapse.  
So why did genuine, even robust, political competition in adequately fair elections 
fail to bring about responsible and effective governance? I argue that Ukraine’s pipelines 
and the unreformed society built up around them lie at the root of the problem in section 
five. I argue that since the post-revolution reforms failed to address the corrupt, opaque 
and monopolistic energy sector as well as the pipeline-revenue-based rentier society, the 
new leaders have retained the two-tiered model to buy loyalty that existed under Kuchma. 
Despite a few new faces in the halls of power, Ukraine under Viktor Yushchenko in 2005 
remained the same corrupt transit-supported rentier state. This uninspiring situation was 
made even worse in 2006 when Russian-state-owned Gazprom demonstrated how badly a 
doubly dependent state such as Ukraine could be hurt by the sending state. The 
agreement arising from the 2006 gas dispute turned Naftogaz from an important 
contributor to the state budget into a massive drain on state resources. As a result, the 
Ukrainian government now lacks adequate resources to finance the programs traditionally 
used to buy mass patronage and support. The combination of Ukraine’s bloated, 
unreformed rentier society and the loss of significant transit revenues has resulted in a 
persistently corrupt government that has driven the country to the edge of bankruptcy.  
Having answered my two puzzling questions, in section six I move on to a 
shadow case study of Belarus to test the generalizability of my preliminary theory. I 
demonstrate how Aleksandr Lukashenka, similar to Kuchma, has defiantly held onto 
power, funding his largely socialist state with transit revenues. The crucial difference for 
  6 
Lukashanko has been that his regime, and the society over which it rules, is even more 
reliant on transit-related revenues than Ukraine and has learned from Kuchma’s mistakes.  
Section seven addresses several alternative explanations, such as the lack EU 
engagement, an ethnically divided populace and common problems of post-communist 
transitions. I find that such hypotheses simply do not appear to be the cause of Ukraine’s 
lackluster democratic performance, or are impacted by transit revenues themselves.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
MONEY FOR NOTHING  
 
 Revenues generated from transiting oil and gas give rise to forces that hinder 
economic development and impede democratic transition and consolidation. In order to 
develop such a theory more fully, I must find a transit country that represent what Max 
Weber calls an ideal type. Given Ukraine’s strategic geographic position between the 
world’s largest energy producer (Russia) and largest combined consumer (the European 
Union), it would appear to be just that ideal. Therefore, this section lays out the details of 
the Russian-Ukrainian energy trade and argues why I feel Ukraine represents the best 
case to study in the theory-generating endeavor.   
The energy trade in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is, unfortunately, 
an opaque industry. As a result, I am forced to piece together the transit puzzle from 
multiple sources, including Russian-, Ukrainian- and English-language publications. In 
part I draw on Naftogaz and Ukrtransnafta reports to provide much of the general 
information about the energy transit trade. There are, however, significant gaps in the 
public record on many of the most important issues (especially concrete pricing and 
payment structures), for which I must rely on second-hand sources, such as Ukrainian 
and Russian newspapers, publications from the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies and 
Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, analysis from dedicated scholars 
as well as correspondence with experts in the field.2   
                                                        
2
 Based on personal correspondence with an anonymous source in Ukraine, November 2009. 
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 First, some very simple background figures: Russia is the single largest exporter 
of energy resources in the world. Russia’s primary market is central and western Europe. 
To get energy resources from the extraction well to the consumers, a large share must 
pass through Ukraine. Annually, roughly 115 billion cubic meters of natural gas and 
30−50 million tons of oil travel through pipelines in Ukraine, pipelines owned by 
government-controlled companies (Naftogaz and Ukrtransnafta). These pipelines through 
Ukraine carry over 80 percent (down from over 90 percent in the 1990s) of Russian gas 
exports destined for Europe and a significant percent of oil exports. The revenues from 
these exports provide Russia with the financial resources necessary to support its 
behemoth state and bloated bureaucracy. 
 So what does Ukraine receive for enabling Russian exporters (and, by proxy, the 
Russian government) to earn such astronomical profits? Nominally speaking, quite a lot. 
The amount varies, but according to my calculations, Ukraine generally receives between 
US $2 and $3 billion annually for transit-related services. In the past several years the 
figure has certainly been closer to US $3 billion combined for oil and gas transit and 
underground storage in facilities located near Ukraine’s western border. Since 
independence, Russia has paid a transit fee ranging between US $1.09 and $1.70 per 
thousand cubic meters per 100 km—which was initially paid wholly in kind—for natural 
gas (which accounts for the vast majority of transit revenues) and has provided energy 
resources at steeply discounted prices (Naftogaz; Tsarenko 2007; Pirani 2009; 
anonymous source 2009).3 Also, Russia has paid between US $4 and $6 per million 
metric tons—depending on the pipeline utilized—for the transit of oil (Energy Charter 
                                                        
3
 For a more detailed breakdown of transit fees and import prices between Russia and Ukraine, see 
Appendix 1. 
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Secretariat). Lastly, Ukraine has received between US $4.95 and $7.85 per thousand 
cubic meters for underground storage (see IERPC; Tsarenko 2007; Pirani et al. 2009; 
Pirani 2009). In addition to those transit and storage services, Ukraine was able to re-
export energy resources imported from Russia for an additional US $1−1.5 billion per 
year (Balmaceda 2008). In total, Ukraine has received between US $3 and $5 billion from 
combined transit, storage and re-export. It is difficult to confidently state what precise 
percentage of government revenues such sums total given the lack of transparent 
accounting practices of Ukrainian energy companies and government. I can, however, 
assert with some level of certainty that in Kuchma’s second term (1999−2004), the value 
of transit-related revenues was equal to between one-half and one-third of government 
revenues. Additionally, transit-related revenues amounted to roughly ten percent of 
Ukrainian GDP. 
The most important thing to note, however, is the evolving nature of payments. 
Given the fluidity of the relationship, I have identified four distinct periods in the 
Russian-Ukrainian gas trade that help make sense of what is an opaque and complex 
business.4 Below, in Table 1, you can see the important characteristics of the four distinct 
periods. 
Table 1: Ukraine’s Energy Trade, 1991−Present  
 Import price Payment type Controlled access to 
energy rents5 
Re-export 
allowed?6 
Direction of cash 
flows 
1991−1999 Low Barter Oligarchs Yes None 
                                                        
4
 I should note that here my analysis is based mostly on gas relations between the two states since gas 
transit is responsible for roughly 80 percent of total transit and storage revenue. Additionally, there is 
significantly less information available as to the details of the oil trade. 
 
5
  For additional details, see chapter 7 in Balmaceda (2008). 
 
6
  For additional details, see chapter 7 in Balmaceda (2008). 
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2000−2005 Low Increasingly 
cash Central government 
Yes, but only 
through Naftogaz Naftogaz to budget 
2006−2008 Moderate Cash Central government No Budget to Naftogaz 
2009− High Cash Central government No Budget to Naftogaz 
 
The first (1991−1999) was marked by barter arrangements, subsidized imports 
and a lack of centralization. Prior to 2000, the pipeline and storage facility operators were 
paid in kind (i.e., in oil and gas equivalent to the determined fee) (see IERPC; Tsarenko 
2007). The revenues generated from selling the obtained oil and gas were used by the 
companies themselves to fill the gaping holes created in their budgets by artificially low 
consumer prices (set by the government) and chronic nonpayment by both industrial and 
household consumers (IERPC; IMF; Tsarenko 2007). Additionally, oligarchic groups 
took advantage of the loose regulatory system and lax government oversight, capturing 
the majority of energy- and transit-related rents for themselves (Balmaceda 2008).  
However, in the middle of 2000, the Ukrainian government could apparently no 
longer be on the outside looking in at the huge transit rents available. The law “On State 
Budget of Ukraine 2000,” required state-owned Naftogaz Ukrainy (which had been 
established and centralized all aspects of the energy trade in 1999) to transfer a portion of 
transit payments received for Russian energy to the state budget (IERPC; Balmaceda 
2008).7 Thus began the monetization of transit payments, a process that, as will be shown 
later in the paper, has had major implications for the political and economic development 
                                                        
7
 Even though the official amount to be transferred to the budget was only a fraction of the total fee paid by 
the sending companies, I consider the entirety of the transit fee to be government revenue for my analysis. 
It is prudent to do so because Naftogaz, the company that collected transit payments, was/is a wholly state-
owned company, whose management is appointed by the government. Furthermore, prior to 2005 Naftogaz 
did not publish any public accounting or operating reports. Kuchma’s use of Naftogaz revenue and assets 
for his personal political gain has been widely discussed both among Ukrainian and US-based experts (see 
D’Anieri 2007, Balmaceda 2008 and Dubrovsky 2007b).  
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in Ukraine. Additionally, Ukraine also received another form of payment: highly 
discounted prices for the additional oil and gas purchased from Russia.  
The second period (2000−2005) was characterized by centralization through 
Naftogaz Ukrainy, the phasing out of in-kind payments and the continuing subsidization 
of imports. By 2005, the Ukrainian pipeline operators were receiving 65 percent of the 
transit fee in cash, giving the government spare resources it had not seen throughout the 
1990s (Tsarenko 2007; Pirani et al. 2009; Pirani 2009). Interestingly, this new inflow of 
cash at the beginning of the 2000s neatly coincides with manipulation and rigging of 
elections as well as increasing expenditures by the state. Additionally, during this period 
world and European prices for energy resources began their seemingly unstoppable rise 
(which could only be halted by a worldwide economic meltdown), all the while the prices 
paid by Ukraine for imported energy remained roughly the same—and in the case of 
natural gas, actually declined. State-owned Naftogaz now controlled access to the highly 
profitable scheme of re-exporting natural gas (Balmaceda 2008). 
In 2006, however, a third era (2006−2008) in Ukrainian-Russian energy relations 
arrived, one characterized by complete monetization of transit payments but shrinking 
subsidies. In response to Ukraine’s mounting energy debt and the arrival of more 
Western-leaning leadership, a gas dispute between Gazprom and Naftogaz came to a 
head in early 2006. The result of this dispute was the complete disavowal of the barter 
system, a significant increase in import prices and the establishment of opaque 
intermediary companies (Pirani et al. 2009). Despite the import price increases, in 
2006−2008 Ukraine still paid more than US $100 less per thousand cubic meters than its 
closest neighbors (excluding Belarus) and EU countries (Tsarenko 2007; Pirani 2009). 
  12
Still, the price increase was substantial—and was not coupled with increased prices for 
domestic consumers—leaving state-run Naftogaz with huge budget holes to fill. At the 
same time, the transit fee paid by Gazprom was not significantly increased. As a result, 
the billions of dollars of transit revenues that had been a boon to the government budget 
were now required to cover Naftogaz’s operating losses; a troubling situation that was 
only to be made worse by the 2009 dispute between Naftogaz and Gazprom.  
Again on the basis of charges of accumulated debt, another energy row between 
Ukraine and Russia arose in January 2009. The arrangement resulting from this dispute 
has led to the fourth era of energy relations between the two countries. The opaque 
intermediary companies were cut out of the lucrative gas trade (Pirani et al. 2009). 
Henceforth Ukraine would pay a substantially higher price for natural gas, 80 percent of 
European netback (i.e., minus transportation costs) in 2009 and the equivalent of 
European netback prices in 2010, thus ending the 17-year tradition of discounted gas 
imports. Additionally, the transit price for natural gas remained the same, at US $1.70 per 
thousand cubic meters per 100 km (Pirani et al. 2009). In stark contrast to the situation in 
the early-2000s, the Ukrainian government is now forced to use budget resources to keep 
Naftogaz out of bankruptcy and help it cover its increasing losses.8 
While the significant inflow of transit revenues into the Ukrainian budget (until 
2005) ought to have been a positive and growth-enabling mechanism, I argue that it is 
precisely these rents that prevented the development of an effective government and 
functioning economy under Kuchma. This phenomenon is what I call the transit curse. 
Additionally, I argue that even though Ukraine’s budget is no longer buoyed by such 
                                                        
8
 For example, in the first two months of 2010, the government has had to pay over 50 percent of 
Naftogaz’s imported gas bill (Interfax March 5, 2010). 
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revenues, political elites have been unable or unwilling to end the costly subsidies that 
were made possible by transit-related revenues and cheap import prices. With that in 
mind, the following sections lays out my basic conceptualization of the curse and the 
legacy of Ukraine’s transit-based society. 
  
 
 
 
 
THE TRANSIT CURSE THESIS  
 
 In the seventies and eighties the notion of a resource curse arose from the counter-
intuitive observation that the developing countries that had been predicted to perform the 
best, due to their generous natural-resource endowments, were nearly universally 
underperforming both economically and politically in comparison to other developing 
nations. As a result of much research and insight, scholars and analysts concluded that it 
was precisely the existence of natural-resource wealth that was hampering significant 
progress. I argue that essentially the same processes at work in resource-rich states are at 
play in transit states as well. Here I draw heavily on Terry Lynn Karl’s, The Paradox of 
Plenty, especially in conceptualizing the processes at work in the political realm. I find 
that there are two areas in which the effects of excess transit revenues very closely mirror 
those of substantial extraction revenues (political and economic development) and one 
area unique to transit countries (state autonomy). I turn now to the three ways that transit 
rents impair a transit-dependent state’s development towards effective governance and a 
diversified economy.   
 
The Dutch Disease 
World Bank analysts were some of the first to systematically explain the counter-
intuitive trend in developing countries (Gelb 1988; Syrnquin and Chenery 1989). In their 
work, these authors identified several characteristics shared by states receiving an 
extraordinarily large proportion of their budgetary revenues from mineral extraction and 
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export that negatively affected their economic development. These states were said to 
suffer from what was termed the Dutch disease. The additional revenues flowing into 
state coffers during a price or production ‘boom’ increase demand for both tradable and 
nontradable goods, which applies upward inflationary pressure, driving up the strength of 
the domestic currency, eventually damaging the international competitiveness of other 
industries (Gelb 1988; Syrnquin and Chenery 1989; Auty 1993; Karl 1997). These 
macroeconomic and sectoral effects lead to a decline in the agricultural and 
manufacturing industries of the economy as well as a distorted expansion of the service 
sector. Such distorted economic development often leads to an eventual ‘bust’, especially 
when the inputs that fueled the initial boom disappear. In resource-rich states this 
generally happens when prices precipitously fall. In transit states like Ukraine, any 
removal of transit revenues could elicit a similar bust.  
 
The Rentier Effect 
 Transit revenues, much like resource rents, also seriously affect the social and 
political aspects of a state. In fact, many of the socio-political effects give rise to the 
economic ones (Karl 1997). When political institutions are too weak to effectively 
constrain regime behavior, transit rents are employed to 1) buy patronage in an effort to 
gain support for their regime and 2) dampen bottom-up pressures for institutional reform, 
improved governance or regime change. This is what has been called the rentier effect 
(Ross 2001). Here the processes at work are two fold: one that garners loyalty through 
lavish government expenditures and subsidies (the spending effect), and the other that 
lessens the tax burden on the population (the taxation effect). Additionally, even when a 
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government adopts potentially useful reforms after the introduction of transit revenues, 
such reforms will be hi-jacked by rent-seeking groups, thus robbing them of the positive 
effect they were intended to have (Karl 1997). Taken together, these aspects provide a 
strong theory for explaining how a government, even if not consciously rent seeking and 
predatory, is driven by transit revenues to use taxation, subsidization and patronage to 
resist pressure to reform institutions and allow them to cling onto power through the next 
election. 
 
Sending State Leverage 
There is another negative effect of increased budgetary revenues, one that is 
unique to transit states: sending state leverage. This leverage, in my opinion, may have 
the most important implications for transit states due to its ability to affect both the 
political and economic spheres of relevant countries. I argue that transit states are 
extraordinarily beholden to the energy-resource sending state, so much so that their 
ability to chart independent economic and political policies is effectively undermined. I 
argue that transit states are doubly susceptible to leverage from the sending state. They 
are vulnerable in the traditional sense that most, if not all, transit states are heavily 
dependent (generally upwards of 75 percent) on the sending state to fulfill their domestic 
energy needs.  An oil or gas cut-off (or even the mere threat) gives the sending state the 
ability to influence both the economics and politics of the transit state. Secondly, the fact 
that the sender provides the transit state with an unusually large portion of its budget 
revenues, a cut-off or construction of bypassing routes again affords the sending state 
significant sway over the transit country. 
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Again, a weak institutional arrangement is crucial for this lever to be truly 
harmful for the transit state. In a developed institutional environment, politicians would 
be held to account for such blatantly poor decision making. In the absence of strong 
institutions, transit rents can be employed to buy loyalty and manipulate elections, thus 
reducing government accountability and blocking the population’s only weapon, the 
threat to “vote the rascals out.”  
 
  
 
 
 
 
THE TRANSIT CURSE IN UKRAINE, 2000−2005 
 
Many casual observers and followers of Ukraine argue that the country’s 
problems under Kuchma stemmed from the president’s suffocating grip on power 
throughout the late-1990s and early-2000s. He has been labeled an authoritarian, a neo-
patrimonialist and a rent-distributing arbiter (Kuzio 2005; van Zon 2005; Dubrovsky 
2007b). While such labels are certainly appropriate, I argue that he was only able to be 
such things on account of the massive pipeline network traversing his country. With that 
in mind, in this section I show how transit revenues led to unhealthy, unsustainable 
economic growth and allowed Kuchma to maintain his hold on the country in the face of 
popular discontent and rising political competition.  
 
The Dutch Disease: Economic Distortion 
The Dutch disease operates in the following way: As extraordinary revenues pour 
into a state, the domestic currency strengthens and demand for both tradable and 
nontradable goods increases. The demand for nontradable goods can be satisfied 
domestically by shifting the economy to favor nontradable sectors, especially the services 
sector. Doing so places upward pressure on wages in all sectors and shifts resources (both 
human and monetary) away from tradable sectors like agriculture and manufacturing. The 
combined effect of a strong currency, wage pressure and reallocation of resources makes 
the agricultural and manufacturing sectors less competitive abroad. Therefore, we expect 
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to see a significant decline in such sectors of the economy coupled with extraordinary 
growth in the services sector.  
In order to investigate the presence of the Dutch disease in Ukraine I employ a 
relatively straightforward operationalization. I utilize a technique pioneered in some of 
the seminal works on the resource cure and create sectoral benchmarks (see Gelb 1988; 
Syrquin and Chenery 1989; Raiser et al. 2003). I rely on data from the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund to create such benchmarks, which illustrate the extent to 
which Ukraine’s economy has been affected by the inflow of transit revenue since the 
establishment of the state-owned company, Naftogaz Ukrainy, and monetization of 
payments. I take a 50-country sample and create a benchmark for the expected share of 
agriculture and services per gross national income per capita (GNI PC). I use GNI PC 
because it has been established that as a country becomes wealthier, the economy 
naturally shifts towards a service-based economy. Therefore, my analysis allows for 
Ukraine’s economic structure to be compared to countries of similar wealth.  
 Ukraine’s agricultural output in 2000 is shown in Figure 1 below. In 2000—the 
final year that transit payments were solely barter based—we can see that the country’s 
agricultural sector very closely matched the estimated curve. In fact its agricultural sector 
was performing slightly better than predicted by the curve.  
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Figure 1: Agricultural Output, % GDP, 2000 
 
Gross national income per capita, PPP, current US $ 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank; Author’s calculations 
 
However, by 2005 we see that Ukraine’s agricultural sector had precipitously 
declined, at a rate much faster than its economic growth would predict. In Figure 2 we 
can that Ukraine’s agricultural sector had become rather distorted, relative to other 
economies of similar size. 
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Figure 2: Agricultural Output, % GDP, 2005
 
Gross national income per capita, PPP, current US $ 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank; Author’s calculations 
 
 Furthermore, when one compares Ukraine to countries that share a communist 
past9, the same pattern emerges. In figures 4 and 5 we see how closely (or not) Ukraine’s 
agricultural sector—in 1999 and 2005, respectively—fits the expected line based on 
central and eastern European countries and states of the former Soviet Union. Again, we 
can see that by 2005, Ukraine’s sector had become significantly distorted. 
 
                                                        
9
 Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan. 
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Figure 3: Agricultural Output, % GDP, CEE and FSU Countries, 1999 
 
Gross national income per capita, PPP, current US $ 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank; Author’s calculations 
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Figure 4: Agricultural Output, % GDP, CEE and FSU Countries, 2005 
 
Gross national income per capita, PPP, current US $ 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank; Author’s calculations 
 
We observe a similar pattern of distortion in Ukraine’s services sector. In figures 
6 and 7, the respective shares of the service sector in 2000 and 2005 are shown. In this 
case, the service sector in 2005 does not appear to be significantly distorted, but when 
compared to the 2000 figure, we can see that it is in the process of correcting for its 
former negatively distorted value. These preliminary findings suggest that the Dutch 
disease may have indeed afflicted Ukraine and invite further research.  
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            Figure 5: Service Sector, % GDP, 2000       
 
Gross national income per capita, PPP, current US $ 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank; Author’s calculations 
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Figure 6: Service Sector, % GDP, 2005 
 
Gross national income per capita, PPP, current US $ 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank; Author’s calculations 
 
The Rentier Effect: A Rentier Society and Rent-Seeking Elites 
 As I explained earlier, transit revenues had a negative socio-political effect as 
well. To my mind, transit rents allowed the state to buy both mass and elite support and 
dampen bottom-up pressure for reforms. First, transit revenues had a spending effect, 
which enabled the regime to buy patronage through various subsidies. Second, the 
substantial external source of revenue permitted a taxation effect, whereby the 
government demanded considerably less in terms of taxes. Third, the natural monopoly of 
transit-related rents led to an elite-loyalty effect, which allowed Kuchma (and 
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Yushchenko in his first year as president) to buy elite support by distributing rents among 
the various elite groupings.  
I make use of data from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to 
provide some quantitative analyses of taxation rates, subsidies and budgetary 
expenditures as well as rely on analysis from Ukrainian scholars and researchers to 
provide anecdotal evidence of such a rentier and rent-seeking society in Ukraine. 
 
The Spending Effect: High Subsidies 
 Since the establishment of a state-owned energy company and introduction of 
monetized payments for energy transit, there has been a consistently upward trend in the 
expenditures of the government. For example, over the period of 2000−2005, general 
government spending on state employees grew from roughly 8 percent of GDP to 11 
percent (IMF Government Financial Statistics). Such increases were used to both increase 
the number of citizens employed by the government as well as increase the salaries for 
such employees, which is evidenced by the 32, 28 and 10.5 percent increases in civil 
service wages in 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively (SIGMA 2006).10 Additionally, 
between 2000 and 2005, unemployment benefits experienced a nearly 1,000 percent 
increase. In Figure 4, you can see that Ukraine has an abnormally high level (for a 
country of its wealth) of subsidies as a percentage of government expenses. 
                                                        
10
 While this could be part of a wider post-communist phenomenon (O’Dwyer 2004), the problem has been 
more pronounced in Ukraine. Public-sector employment in Ukraine has continued to grow irresponsibly, 
despite the arrival of meaningful competition and fair elections. ILO data on Ukrainian public-sector 
employment, the overall number of government employees hasn’t grown exceptionally, but that fails to 
account for the privatization of thousands of state-owned companies in 2005−2009. 
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Figure 7: Subsidies, % of Expenses, 2000
 
Gross national income per capita, PPP, current US $ 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank; Author’s calculations 
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Figure 8: Subsidies, % of Expenses, 2005
 
Gross national income per capita, PPP, current US $ 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank; Author’s calculations 
 
When we compare Ukraine’s expenditures on subsidies to other post-communist 
countries, Kuchma’s willingness to deploy state funds in a bid to gain popular support 
becomes all the clearer. While many of Ukraine’s neighbors were busy dismantling the 
Soviet-era system of huge government expenditures and subsidies, Kuchma employed the 
newly centralized transit to increase what was, by international standards, an already 
generous system of subsidies. In figures 10 and 11 below, we see that from 1999 to 2005, 
Ukraine significantly increased the amount of subsidies it doled out to the population. I 
argue that such generous increases were made possible by the monetization and 
centralization of transit rents in 2000. 
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Figure 9: Subsidies, % of Expenses, CEE and FSU Countries, 1999 
 
Gross national income per capita, PPP, current US $ 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank; Author’s calculations 
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Figure 10: Subsidies, % of Expenses, CEE and FSU Countries, 2005 
 
Gross national income per capita, PPP, current US $ 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank; Author’s calculations 
 
Additionally, under Kuchma Ukrainian citizens paid an artificially low price for 
natural gas. As evidenced in Appendix 1, the price paid for imported Russian gas was 
generally US $100 per thousand cubic meters of natural gas less than its European 
neighbors throughout the 2000s. This drastically reduced price was in turn passed onto 
Ukrainian consumers, amounting to a very sizable subsidy to the population. I argue that 
this subsidy was crucial in the government’s attempts to buy political loyalty.  
In 2004, 45 percent of the population still selected Yanukovich in the re-run of the 
second round of the 2004 presidential elections, after it had been widely established and 
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accepted that Kuchma and Yanukovich had committed massive fraud in an attempt to 
steal the election (see Section 4 for a brief description of the events surriounding the 2004 
election). The fact that such a large portion of the electorate is willing to support the 
government after such public revelations indicates more of a client-patron relationship, 
than of a healthy democracy. While transit revenues did not allow Kuchma to buy the 
support of the entire population, it appears that he was able to create a sizable base whose 
loyalty was unwavering.11 
 
The Taxation Effect: Low Taxes 
  Just as transit revenues provide the government with additional resources with 
which to subsidize society, they also permit the government to lessen the tax burden, in 
an effort to dampen demands for accountable governance. Scholars such as Barrington 
Moore, Jr. have argued that a government’s need to levy taxes and support an army led to 
citizen demands for increased participation. Therefore, the less a government demands 
from its people in the form of taxes, the less the people demand from the government. In 
figures 12 and 13 we can see that Ukraine in the early- to mid-2000s collected very little 
of its revenues from taxes on individuals.  
                                                        
11
 The generous social benefits (which were largely made possible by transit revenues) were not the only 
reason nearly half of the population supported Yanukovich in the re-run of the 2004 presidential elections, 
but I imagine they played a less-than-insignificant role in the calculations of voters. 
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Figure 11: Tax on Income, Profits and Gains, % Revenue, 2000 
 
Gross national income per capita, PPP, current US $ 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank; Author’s calculations 
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Figure 12: Tax on Income, Profits and Gains, % Revenue, 2005 
 
Gross national income per capita, PPP, current US $ 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank; Author’s calculations 
 
Compared with other relatively poor countries (in ternm of gross national income 
per capita), Ukraine’s tax revenues from individuals are nothing terribly out of the 
ordinary. It is grouped rather tightly with other countries of similar wealth. However, 
when you consider that Ukraine did have a relatively high level of revenues (see figures 
14 and 15 below), especially for an economy of its size, you can see that the government 
demanded considerably less from its citizens. It was able to demand less due to the 
reliable inflow of external sources of cash, transit revenue. I would argue that absent 
significant transit rents, the Ukrainian government would simply have lacked the funds to 
pay for the aforementioned generous subsidies and expenditures.  
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 Figure 13: Revenue, % of GDP, 2000
 
Gross national income per capita, PPP, current US $ 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank; Author’s calculations 
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Figure 14: Revenue, % of GDP, 2005
 
Gross national income per capita, PPP, current US $ 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank; Author’s calculations 
 
Elite-Loyalty Effect: Distributing Rent 
 The pipelines through Ukraine, as a centralized natural monopoly, also permitted 
the government to distribute the significant rents available in the transit and energy 
businesses. In other post-Soviet countries, the dispersed and non-monopolized nature of 
rent-seeking opportunities allowed non-state actors to take control the most profitable 
industries. In Ukraine, however, Kuchma was the sole arbiter in energy-trade-related 
sectors of the economy (Dubrovsky 2007b). This was an incredibly important means by 
which Kuchma could guarantee the support of economic elites. In the literature on 
Kuchma-era Ukraine, many scholars note that the president masterfully balanced 
  36
different oligarchic groups, ensuring they remained loyal without any single one 
becoming too powerful (Balmaceda 2008; D’Anieri 2007). The support of such 
oligarchic groups was exceedingly important for Kuchma as he relied on these elites for 
financial support in elections and the deployment of their vast and varied media 
resources.  
This client-patron arrangement in a semiauthoritarian system was able to maintain 
equilibrium in the short to medium term. However, simmering domestic opposition 
disenchanted by, among other things, the Gongadze affair and continued corruption, as 
well as sustained international pressure showed that an undemocratic regime buoyed by 
transit wealth may not be stable in the long run. Some opportunistic rent-seeking elites 
(both economic and political) sensed that regime turnover was possible and lent support 
to Yushchenko in the run-up to the 2004 presidential election. These crucial ‘flip-flops’ 
proved to be just enough, in combination with major international support, to usher in 
what was then seen as the arrival of democracy and legitimate governance.12    
 
Sending State Leverage: Russian Influence 
 There is one more way in which transit states can be said to suffer from some sort 
of curse. I argue that countries such as Kuchma-era Ukraine are doubly dependent on the 
country that sends the oil and gas. In 2000−2005 Ukraine was especially susceptible to 
pressure form Russia due to the fact that it provided the country with a significant 
                                                        
18 The fact that a transit-revenue-supported semiauthoritarian state is less stable than resource-rich states is 
not surprising. The fact that Saudi Arabia and Russia have significantly greater resources at their disposal, 
allow their regimes to spend more and tax less, thus enabling their regimes to be more stable in the medium 
to long term. However, the simple fact that transit revenues delayed the eventual democratic opening in 
Ukraine has had lasting consequences (Vachudova 2005). This post-transit-wealth legacy will be addressed 
in Section 4.   
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proportion of its energy resources for domestic consumption as well as a large sum of 
budgetary revenues. Additionally, Ukraine’s energy-intensive economy (in the top three 
by the International Energy Agency’s calculations) depends on relatively cheap energy 
resources to remain profitable. Theoretically, the entire chemical production industry 
becomes loss making when the price for gas exceeds US $200 per thousand cubic meters 
(Davis et al. 2005).13 Similarly, the steel industry also requires cheap energy to produce 
internationally competitive products.  
 I argue that it is precisely for these reasons that Russia has been able to wield 
extraordinary influence in Ukraine. This influence expresses itself in arrangements and 
deals that can be seen to run counter to Ukrainian national interests. The 2000s are rife 
with examples. The most obvious relate directly to the energy trade itself. All three fees 
charged by Ukraine (gas transit, oil transit and gas storage) are grossly out of line with 
international norms. For example, in Table 2 below, you can see how outrageously low 
the transit fee charged by Naftogaz under Kuchma was in comparison with some EU 
countries. 
Table 2: Assorted Gas Transit Fees 
 Ukraine France Denmark Hungary The 
Netherlands 
EU average 
Transit fee14 1.09 4.58 7.82 6.66 5.54 5.35 
Source: “Gazovoy viklik” 
 
 
The gas dispute of 2006 serves as a useful example to demonstrate the power of 
Russia’s leverage. Gazprom managed to steeply increase the price paid by Ukraine while 
keeping transit revenues far below market norms. The result of the 2006 dispute and 
                                                        
13
 Considering the European market price for natural gas was US $241, $248, $350 and roughly $400 in 
2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 respectively, it is unrealistic to expect the chemicals industry to remain 
competitive in market conditions. 
 
14
 In US dollars per 1000 cubic meters per 100 km 
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subsequent unfavorable agreement has placed a huge strain on Ukraine’s budget, which 
has led to dangerously large budget deficit each of the past four years. Furthermore, the 
higher import prices negatively affected other sectors of Ukraine’s economy, depressing 
the export of metallurgical and chemical products (Segura and Pogaska 2006). Evidence 
of the impact of higher import prices on the health of the Ukrainian economy can be seen 
vividly in Table 3 below. The higher fee charged by Gazprom has made Ukrainian steel 
and chemical products less competitive, which has significantly depressed exports.  
Table 3: Current Account Balance, % GDP 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Ukraine 4.7 3.7 7.5 5.8 10.6 2.9 -1.5 -4.2 -7.6 -9.7 
Source: Government Finance Statistics, IMF 
 
 
In total, since Yushchenko came to office in 2005, the transit price has only 
increased by 35 percent while the price charged by Russia has increased 450 percent 
(Tsarenko 2007, Pirani et al. 2009, Pirani 2009). This is the price Yushchenko has had to 
pay for his willingness to adopt policies undesirable to the Kremlin. Such an 
extraordinary rate hike placed an incredible strain on the regime’s ability to govern 
effectively. For example, the 2009 increase in import prices largely contributed to the 15 
percent contraction in GDP and 12 percent budget deficit in 2009.  
Such economic effects have also spilled over into the political sphere as well. 
Ukraine’s poor economic performance was largely responsible for both Yushchenko’s 
and Tymoshenko’s defeat in the 2010 presidential elections. Furthermore, Russia has the 
ability to influence Ukrainian politics by hinting that some presidential candidates may be 
able to negotiate better deals with Moscow than others.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
REVOLUTION AND UNMET EXPECTATIONS 
 
 In 2004, post-Soviet Ukraine went through its fourth iteration of presidential 
elections. Kuchma and his loyal oligarchs spent lavishly in the run-up to the first round of 
polling that took place in October, doling out millions of hryvnias in pension increases 
and wage arrears. In that first round of voting, however, Kuchma’s hand-picked 
successor, Viktor Yanukovich, finished behind Viktor Yushchenko, who had allegedly 
been poisoned during the campaign. Since no single candidate obtained a 50-percent 
majority, electors went to the voting booths again on November 21. After the results were 
counted, Yanukovich held a slim 3-percent lead. His winning vote tally, however, 
included nearly 100-percent turnout in Yanukovich’s home region of Donetsk as well as 
a suspiciously large influx of last-minute absentee ballots from the southern and eastern 
parts of Ukraine. The results were unanimously decried as fraudulent by impartial 
observers. 
Apparently Kuchma and Yanukovich overestimated their ability to withstand 
accusations of manipulation. However, by 2004 anti-Kuchma forces had learned from 
other electoral revolutions abroad and were better able to expose blatant fraud, unlike in 
2000 and 2002 (McFaul 2007). As a result of massive protests and international pressure, 
a re-run of the second round was held on December 26. Yushchenko narrowly won.   
 For many, the events culminating in Yushchenko’s victory marked the beginning 
of a new era in post-independence Ukraine (Christensen et al. 2005). Domestic and 
international press as well as scholars proclaimed that the orange-clad tandem of 
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Yushchenko and Tymoshenko were going to effect the change many Ukrainians had been 
waiting for. For example Taras Kuzio argued that, “The election in 2004 completed 
Ukraine’s transition from a post-Soviet state to a European one” (Kuzio 2005). 
Additionally, in 2005 many major journals devoted significant space to discuss what the 
‘revolution’ meant and how it would change Ukraine.15 The initial reforms and 
constitutional alterations only encouraged such supporters all the more. A balancing of 
presidential power, strengthening of the party system and depoliticizing of electoral 
regulations gave democracy advocates much to cheer about. 
 Unfortunately, such optimism proved to be short lived. Despite the rhetoric of 
change employed during the campaign, the team of Yushchenko and Tymoshenko (as 
president and prime minister, respectively) introduced the fewest number of legislative 
proposals in any period in post-Soviet Ukraine (Tudoroiu 2007). While we have seen a 
genuine improvement in the fairness of electoral contests and more limited presidential 
powers, accountable governance has failed to arise with them.16 Therefore, I look at 
Ukraine’s annual budget deficits as well as corruption indices to measure Ukraine’s 
progress in terms of governance. Contrary to what many expected, Ukraine has 
performed abysmally. Despite the fact that politicians now face the real possibility of 
being replaced in free and fair elections, Ukrainian leaders have failed to govern 
effectively and responsibly. In Table 4, you can see the lack of improvement in Ukraine’s 
score in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index since the Orange 
Revolution. Whereas in Table 5, it is evident that Ukraine’s budgetary situation has 
markedly worsened since Kuchma’s time in office.  
                                                        
15
 See the spring 2005 issues of Journal of Democracy, Problems of Post-Communism. 
 
16
 I define accountable governance as fiscally responsible and corruption minimizing.  
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Table 4: Corruption Perceptions Index Scores, 2004−2009 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
CPI score, 10-point scale 2.2 2.6 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.2 
Percentile 15% 32% 39% 34% 25% 18% 
Source: Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, accessed at 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009 
 
 
Table 5: Average Annual Budget Deficit, % GDP 
 Average deficit 
2000−2004 -0.92% 
2005-2009 
-3.37% 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics; Author’s calculations 
 Additionally, Transparency International’s Nations in Transit report has shown 
there to be essentially no improvement in terms of governance as that organization 
defines it.  
Table 6: Nations in Transit Ratings17 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Governance 4.75 4.75 5.00 5.00 5.25      
Nat’l 
democratic 
governance 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 5.0018 4.50 4.75 4.75 5.00 
Local 
democratic 
governance 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 
Source: Nations in Transit (2009) Ukraine Country Report, accessed at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=17 
 
 In addition to the orange-clad duo’s stated intentions to clean up the economy and 
political system, they also made a lot of noise about reforming Ukraine’s energy 
business. Most notably, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko touted initiatives to build a 
pipeline from Turkmenistan, acquire oil and gas from Iran as well as produce energy 
abroad (through Naftogaz) and transport it into Ukraine cheaply (Balmaceda 2008). Just 
                                                        
17
 On a scale of one to seven, one represents the best score. 
 
18
 Starting with 2005 edition, Freedom House introduced separate analysis and ratings for national 
democratic governance and local democratic governance to provide more detailed and nuanced analysis of 
these two subjects. 
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as the Orange coalition did not follow through on promises to improve economic and 
democratic governance, they also failed to enact meaningful energy-sector reforms. With 
that in mind, the following several paragraphs detail how little Yushchenko and 
Tymoshenko actually changed in the energy trade.  
On first glance, there did seem to be quite a shake-up in the energy industry in 
2005. All of energy heads closely associated with Kuchma (i.e., the presidents of state-
owned energy companies as well as the minister of energy) were replaced in the first 
several months of Yushchenko’s tenure. While the exit of bureaucrats widely viewed as 
corrupt should be considered a step in the right direction, Ukrainian-energy expert 
Margarita Balmaceda (2008) noted that the old elite were simply replaced with “second-
tier” elites and oligarchs associated with Yushchenko. Within months of this changeover, 
energy-related scandals were already surfacing. In early 2005, the new justice minister 
and a parliamentary deputy were involved in an illicit oil re-export scheme and abuse of 
power, respectively (Balmaceda 2008). Additionally, many of the new appointees were 
associated with factions that had simply fallen out of favor with Kuchma in preceding 
several years. For example, Naftogaz’s new head, Aleksey Ivchenko, was closely tied to 
Igor Bakai, whose trading company was the main intermediary company bringing central 
Asian gas to Ukraine prior to the formation of Naftogaz in 1999 (Balmaceda 2008). 
Furthermore, many of the major players under Kuchma, such as Sergey Pereloma, were 
merely placed in second-line positions. Furthermore, in 2006 it became known that 
Dmitriy Firtash (one of the main energy-related oligarchs and who can be linked to the 
most powerful opaque intermediary companies throughout the 1990s) was a major 
financial backer of Yushchenko’s campaign (Balmaceda 2008). It is, therefore, hardly 
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surprising that Firtash benefitted handsomely from the 2006 arrangement following 
Naftogaz’s dispute with Gazprom. 
Additionally, investigations into corruption in the energy trade failed to be 
executed in full. In March 2005, the new government appeared to be following up on one 
of its campaign promises to investigate corruption in Naftogaz (Balmaceda 2008). 
Inquiries into Yushchenko’s appointees were opened in early to mid 2005. However, it 
was widely reported that Yushchenko personally stepped in to halt the investigations into 
companies and ministries controlled by “his” people (Mostovaya 2006). 
This lack of progress in energy-sector reform and governance has not gone 
unnoticed. Ukraine is now said to be at a ‘crossroad’ and the success of the electoral 
revolution began to be seriously questioned (Kuzio 2007; Tudoroiu 2007; Dubrovsky 
2007a). Clearly, post-Kuchma Ukraine has not only failed to live up to the lofty 
expectations assigned to it, but it has completely failed in improving citizens’ lives, 
managing the economy responsibly and reducing corruption.  
This disconnect between improved elections and stagnant (if not declining) 
governance begs the question: Why is governance worsening despite better democratic 
standards? It is well beyond the scope of this paper to explore all of the arguments 
underpinning the rationale for democracy, but if leaders regularly have to face voters, 
they should pursue policies viewed as effective, sustainable and responsible. Clearly this 
is not happening in post-Kuchma Ukraine. So what, then, is preventing good governance 
from arising?  
  
 
 
 
THE LEGACY OF A PIPELNE-BASED RENTIER SOCIETY 
 
 I argue that Ukraine’s pipelines are largely responsible for the disappointing 
performance of post-Kuchma governments in Ukraine. The Orange Revolution only 
brought about a change of leadership and limited electoral reform. The Dutch-disease-
afflicted economy, the extant rentier society and Russia’s extraordinary influence all 
remained in place (Aslund and Paskhaver 2010). First, despite the rotation of president 
and prime minister in 2005, the three-pronged transit curse was still present in Ukraine. 
Looking at the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, we see growth in the main 
indicators related to the Dutch disease and rentier effect. The agriculture sector continued 
to shrink while the services sector became even more bloated. At the same time, subsidies 
and expenditures continued to rise. In Table 7 below, you can see that the economic and 
social trends that arose under Kuchma only continued under Yushchenko. Interestingly, 
tax revenues did substantially increase in 2005. This only solidifies my belief that a more 
legitimate regime (one fairly elected) can demand more from the population by way of 
taxes. 
Table 7: Transit Curse Indicators, 2001−2005 
 
Agriculture, % GDP Services, % GDP Expense, % GDP Tax revenue, % GDP 
2001 16.37 48.90 27.62 12.06 
2002 14.62 50.78 28.99 13.10 
2003 12.10 53.31 29.71 13.65 
2004 11.93 52.20 32.98 13.28 
2005 10.40 57.26 36.05 17.12 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 
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 I believe this situation would have continued if not for the 2006 and 2009 gas 
disputes. Russia’s deep-rooted leverage became painfully clear in the winter of 
2005−2006. At the end of 2005, Naftogaz and Gazprom were in the midst of a price 
dispute. There has been much discussion of and disagreement about the underlying 
factors (political and economic), but the fact remains that Russia—through state-
controlled Gazprom—was able to exert its significant influence and received supply and 
transit agreements extremely favorable to the Russian side. Gazprom managed to extract 
a 100-percent increase in the price paid by Ukraine in 2006, lock in hugely discounted 
transit fees and capture distribution rights for the few profit-making sectors of the 
domestic Ukrainian market (Pirani 2009; Ukrainskaya Pravda 2009). The fact that the 
Ukrainian side would agree to such unfavorable terms, I believe, demonstrates how much 
leverage the Russian side had in the negotiations. 
This 2006 agreement effectively flipped the arrangement whereby the Ukrainian 
budget received significant inputs from transit-related revenues on its head. With one 
stroke of the pen, the Ukrainian leadership effectively cut off a major source of revenue 
for both the state company, Naftogaz, and the state budget. If the initial doubling of the 
import price was not enough, the price was stipulated to grow every year. In fact, in the 
first quarter of 2010, prices paid by Naftogaz were significantly higher than European 
spot prices.  
At the same time, domestic Ukrainian consumers failed to pay a proportionally 
increased price for resources consumed. In fact households actually paid a lower fee in 
2009 than they did in 2006 (Pirani et al. 2009). This situation has resulted in huge losses 
for Naftogaz, even after the billions of dollars in transit revenue paid by Gazprom. In 
  46
2009 the company lost US $2.5 billion from the business of supplying households with 
natural gas (Pavel 2009). Additionally, electricity-generating companies are running up 
exorbitant losses as a result of the increase in energy prices. Such huge losses have had to 
be covered by funds from the national budget. Furthermore, a Gazprom subsidiary was 
guaranteed a 25 percent share of the domestic industrial gas market, a share which has 
since been increased to nearly 50 percent (Pirani 2009; Ukrainskaya Pravda 2009). This 
is significant because the regulated tariff for industrial consumers is three times higher 
than that for households and is the only profitable sector of Ukraine’s gas distribution 
market (Tsarenko 2007). The combined effect of all of this has been the reversal of the 
flow of budgetary revenues that existed under Kuchma.   
 Despite this huge loss of revenues to the government, political elites have failed to 
adjust government expenditures accordingly. I believe that the rentier state, similar to 
formal governmental institutions, is extremely ‘sticky’ and difficult to dismantle once it 
has been established. Other governments, notably Latvia, have, in the face of declining 
revenues, reduced the subsidies and increased taxes. In Ukraine this has simply not 
happened. In fact, in the run-up to the 2010 presidential elections, both Yushchenko and 
Tymoshenko increased pensions as well as agricultural and industrial subsidies (FT 
2009).  
 It is safe to say that Ukraine currently finds itself in a ‘bust’ period very similar to 
the one experienced by oil exporting states amid the collapse of prices in the 1980s. 
Ukraine has lost a significant source of revenue and its leaders appear unable to dismantle 
the vast network of social benefits that arose when the government could rely on a steady 
stream of external revenues.
  
 
 
 
 
LUKASHENKA’S PIPELINES 
 
 As my transit curse theory is, as far I know, the first to link oil and gas pipelines 
to stunted economic and political development explicitly, it would be prudent to see if 
another country with transit-related revenues is similarly affected. With that in mind, this 
section details post-communist Belarus, a country as comparable to Ukraine at 
independence as possible. Both countries share similar pasts. Historically, they constitute 
two parts of ancient Rus’ (Shevtsov 2005). In the twentieth century they were original 
Soviet republics and somewhat reluctant breakaways of the Soviet Union. Currently, and 
for my purposes most importantly, they are the major transit routes for Russian energy 
resources. 
 Whereas Ukraine is the main corridor for Russian natural gas, Belarus is the chief 
passageway for crude oil and oil products. Annually, 50 percent, or 70−80 million metric 
tons, of Russia’s oil-related exports pass through Belarus. Additionally, 20 percent, or 
roughly 25 billion cubic meters, of Russian natural gas finds its way to European markets 
through Belarusian pipelines. Much like Ukraine, Belarus has managed to leverage its 
strategic position to receive significant monetary benefits from Russia. Interestingly, 
Belarus has been able to extract even more money (both nominally and relative to GDP) 
and cheaper prices than Ukraine. 
 Like Ukraine, Belarus has received certain tariffs for transiting oil and gas as well 
as payment for storage near its western borders. Over the years the sum has fluctuated, 
but on average, the state-owned companies have received approximately US $1−2 billion 
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for such services. Besides those sizeable revenues (especially when you consider that 
Belarus’s GDP only surpassed US $20 billion in 2004), Lukashenka’s government has 
annually earned and additional US $5 billion from various re-export schemes. The most 
profitable scheme—by which Belarus purchases oil from Russia ostensibly for domestic 
consumption but then refines and sells a large portion to European consumers, with an 
export duty attached—has netted the government between US $3 and $4 billion in recent 
years (Novozhilovo 2006). Additionally, Belarus has continued to receive energy imports 
at a steeply discounted price while Ukraine essentially pays European netback prices. For 
example, in January 2010 Ukraine paid US $305 per thousand cubic meters whereas 
Belarus paid US $168 (Gavrish et al. 2010). Some analysts have calculated the discounts 
received by Belarus to total US $10 billion dollars, or roughly a quarter of the country’s 
GDP (Fadeyev 2006). 
 Such large revenues are particularly impressive bearing in mind that Belarus is a 
resource-bereft country with Soviet-era industrial production facilities. Without such 
large revenues, it is unlikely that Lukashanko’s unreformed economic and political 
system would still be intact (Shevtsov 2005; Gayduk et al. 2009). The transit-related 
resources have enabled Lukashenka to establish a rentier state even more encompassing 
and resilient to reform than in Ukraine. Just as Kuchma did in Ukraine, Lukashenka has 
highly subsidized society through lavish social spending and low taxation. For example, 
in 2006 the government doled out US $2 billion in agricultural subsidies (Zlotnikov 
2006). In return he receives a passive citizenry, content in the fact that their standard of 
living was protected from the nosedive seen in all other post-Soviet economies (Marples 
2007; Gayduk 2009).  
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 Interestingly, though, Belarus has experienced uninterrupted growth since the 
mid-1990s—while most other post-Soviet countries were still wallowing in the doldrums 
of transition. Belarus’s growth has been anchored by its strong industrial sector, which 
still accounts for a quarter of its GDP. Clearly, then, a transit-induced Dutch disease has 
not stricken Belarus as has happened in Ukraine. Considering the fact that Belarus’s 
economy is largely controlled by the government, which directs the majority of human 
and financial capital, it is not terribly surprising that the Belarusian economy managed to 
avoid the transit trap that ensnared Ukraine. As I mentioned earlier, the shift of 
productive capacity from the manufacturing and agricultural sectors to services is the key 
ingredient in Dutch-disease-related distorted economic growth. Since Belarus’s economy 
largely lacks the necessary market principles, its non-market economy has not 
experienced such adjustments.  
 So what does all this say about the prospects for economic and democratic 
development in Belarus? Despite the fact few cracks have appeared in the regime, a new 
development ought to give Lukashenka something to worry about. In January 2010, a 
relatively minor dispute arose between Russia and Belarus. The agreement signed to end 
the dispute did not call for significant import price or transit fee increases, instead 
Belarus is no longer able to import duty-free energy products to be resold to European 
consumers.19 As this re-export scheme has been the prime cash cow for Lukashenka in 
recent years, this has serious consequences for the state built up by the Soviet-era strong 
man. It will be important to see if this loss of government revenues will result in 
significant expenditure cuts and tax rises as well. I believe that the ‘stickiness’ of the 
                                                        
19
 From 2006 onward there had been increasing duties paid by Belarus, but until 2010 there had always 
been significant loopholes and profitable schemes. 
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rentier society in Belarus—just as in Ukraine—will prevent such fiscally responsible 
moves.   
  
 
 
 
 
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
 
 In this section, I seek to strengthen my transit curse theory by demonstrating that 
several alternative hypotheses are not better able to explain the disappointing democratic 
development of the late-1990s as well as early- and mid-2000s. I have identified potential 
competing theories as to what has stunted Ukraine’s post-communist development: 1) the 
lack of EU engagement; 2) ethnic divisions; and, 3) exploitation of partial reforms by 
post-communist rent seekers. 
First, it has been argued that EU involvement is one of the most effective 
democratizing levers (Vachudova 2005; Cameron 200720). It stands to reason, then, that a 
lack of engagement from the EU (as was the case in Ukraine) can be seen as a hindrance 
to democratization. Had the EU been more actively involved and offered a viable path 
towards membership—as it did with Poland and the Baltic states—Ukraine would have 
had a better chance at developing a better functioning democracy. However, with regards 
to Kuchma-era Ukraine, it seems that the lack of engagement was mostly from the 
Ukrainian side. Kuchma and his allies thrived on the opaque business, regulatory and 
institutional environment; an environment that would have had to be reformed in any 
accession process. An authoritarian ruler such as Kuchma, with reliable access to 
revenues (through the pipeline network) and whose power came from his ability to 
disperse associated rents would never voluntarily agree to the scrutiny and reforms 
demanded from the acquis process. Additionally, Russia’s ability to cripple Kuchma’s 
                                                        
20
 The author does provide numerous caveats, but does at least credit the hope of joining the EU as a strong 
indicator of economic and democratic development. 
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rentier state most likely factored into his decision not to seek closer ties to the EU. 
Therefore, while one could make the argument that EU non-involvement was responsible 
for lagging political development, transit pipelines would have to be considered as at 
least one of the causes of non-engagement.   
 Second, Ukraine’s geographically and linguistically divided population could also 
be seen as the main obstacle to democratic development. There are many examples from 
around the globe where one group (be it ethnic, linguistic or geographic) dominates 
political and economic life and impedes further reforms in order to maintain its privileged 
place in society. However, most scholarship attests to Kuchma’s unique ability to balance 
the different regional and ethnic groups (Balmaceda 2008; D’Anieri 2007). Therefore, I 
do not believe ethnic or geographic divisions can be responsible for undermining 
democratic development under Kuchma. 
 Third, many scholars have noted that poor economic and democratic development 
is common among post-communist states that did not immediately replace old 
communists with reformers and experience intense electoral competition. In many cases, 
old communist elites simply exploit the partial reforms for their political and economic 
benefit (Hellman 1998). These elites will continue to pillage the state and its resources so 
long as there is no meaningful competition and realistic threat of losing power in 
relatively fair elections (Vachudova 2005; Grzymala-Busse 2006). These arguments have 
proven to possess significant explanatory power across the post-communist world. For 
example, in Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine, the first stage of 
transition was exploited by former elites and reforms were predictably frozen. In Ukraine 
in the early- and mid-1990s, this lack of complete reform had little to do with the pipeline 
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network and transit revenues. However, I would argue that by the late-1990s economic 
and democratic pressures were creating the opening for a second stage in the transition of 
the initial laggards. Challenges to the ruling regimes began to appear as many grew 
frustrated with the fact that elites had promised so much but delivered so little. In some 
countries increased competition led to reforms and democratic consolidation. In Ukraine, 
however, Kuchma centralized rent-seeking opportunities and all domestic power by 
establishing firm control over the country’s transit resources. Kuchma then used transit 
revenues and access to the energy markets in order to bribe a populace into relative 
passivity, buy loyalty from rent-seeking elites and cheat his opponents out of electoral 
victory.  While elites in Romania and Bulgaria were forced to adopt further reforms in the 
face of increased competition, Ukraine—and Belarus—was able to employ its resources 
to stymie such challenges. It is appropriate and instructive to extend Hellman’s, 
Vachudova’s and Grzymala-Busse’s theories into the later stages of post-communist 
transition.  
  
  
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 I started this research project seeking to answer two vexing questions. First, what 
was preventing Ukraine—a country which should have been one of the post-Soviet 
leaders—from fostering healthy economic growth and democratic development through 
out the late-1990s and early-2000s? And second, why, despite the eventual improvement 
in electoral fairness following the Orange Revolution, is Ukraine still hampered by 
irresponsible governance and rampant corruption? My research indicates that Ukraine’s 
massive pipeline network, and the revenues it generates, can be seen as the root of both 
evils.  
 I argue that after Lenoid Kuchma centralized the transit-related rent-seeking 
opportunities by establishing an overarching national energy company, Naftogaz 
Ukrainy, the country became afflicted with a transit curse. This three-pronged curse 
damaged healthy economic growth, created a corrupt rentier society and gave Russia 
extraordinary influence over the country as a whole. Unfortunately for Kuchma, such a 
transit-revenue-supported rentier state was not stable over the long term. The shifting 
loyalty of both elites and the masses allowed for the seemingly monumental events of 
December 2004. Additionally, the fact that Naftogaz Ukrainy was not established until 
1999 allowed for non-state groups to amass substantial power and wealth, which proved 
difficult for Kuchma to rein in and control completely (Way 2005).  
 In 2005 there was much optimism and hope for Ukraine’s newly democratic 
future. Unfortunately, only select electoral laws and institutional arrangements were 
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reformed in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution. As a result, Ukraine’s opaque 
energy sector and rentier society remained, while Russia continued to possess undue 
sway over the government. The early weeks of 2006 witnessed a demonstration of 
Russia’s leverage. The agreement that ended the gas dispute was breathtakingly 
unfavorable to Ukraine. The transit revenues that had been a boon to the government 
budget were now not sufficient to cover the losses incurred by Naftogaz. In the following 
years, no leader has proved willing to upset the electorate and disassemble the expansive 
rentier state established under Kuchma. As a result, Ukraine’s government now stands on 
the brink of bankruptcy. 
 Additionally, the unreformed energy sector has remained a bastion for corrupt 
business practices and affect all aspects of life in Ukraine. Since Yushchenko took office, 
the major corruption indices have shown corruption in the country to be on the rise.  
 Lastly, Russia still retains much of its leverage, albeit slightly diminished now 
that it does not effectively prop up the Ukrainian budget. Russia can still affect domestic 
Ukrainian politics by favoring particular politicians and suggesting who might be able to 
win more favorable energy deals with Gazprom. 
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APPENDIX 
Gas Transit in Ukraine 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
1H 2H 
Transit (bcm) 119.9 122.8 119.4 123.2 132.4 130.7 128.5 115.2 119.6  
Transit fee 
per 1000 cm 
per100km 
1.09 1.09 1.09 1.46 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 
Value of 
transit 
service 
(million US 
$) 
1,468 1,418 1,597 
 
1,456 1,569 1,536 2,200 2,200 2,200  
Price paid by 
Ukraine for 
gas (US $ per 
1000 cm) 
50 50 50 67 50 50 50 95 130 179.5 360 271 198 208 
European 
market price 
(cif) for gas 
(US $ per 
1000 cm) 
90.3 115.3 96.1 122.2 126.7 165.3 241.4 248.1 350.3  
Source: Tsarenko 2007, Pirani 2009, various Naftogaz and Ukrtransnafta reports and BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy; Author’s calculations 
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